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EMERGING JURISDICTIONAL
DOCTRINES OF THE BURGER COURT: A
DOCTRINE OF CONVENIENCE
As originally conceived by the Framers of the Constitution,
the judiciary was intended to be the only branch of the federal
government physically unable to enforce its own rulings.' Thus
arose the characterization of the judiciary as the weakest branch of
government.2 Due to the need for impartial federal judges, this
structure was deemed necessary because the federal judiciary is the
only branch of government that is inherently undemocratic. 3 Recognizing that the dependence of the judiciary on the coordinate
branches for enforcement of its decisions places it in a uniquely
sensitive position in the scheme of the federal government, the Supreme Court consistently has sought to maximize the power of the
judicial branch through two basic, distinct jurisdictional devices.4
One approach seeks to maximize federal judicial power through an
expansive reading of article III of the Constitution,5 thus extending
the original and appellate jurisdiction of the courts to hear cases
that may only tangentially "arise under" article III, but that never1 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). "The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever." Id.; see
also 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 178 (T. Nugent trans. 1873).
2 See R. HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. SUPREm COURT 109 (1980); see

also M. WENDELL, BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 26 (1949) (since Court does not
have power to enforce its decisions, others must be relied upon to legitimate its mandates).
' See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (Court cannot entertain cases
that are political in nature); see Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 623 (1981).
' See infra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
5 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III, § 2 provides, in pertinent part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;...
...In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.
Id. Congress has specifically provided for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction of state
court decisions addressing federal questions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982); see also infra note
133 (discussing construction of § 1257).
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theless involve important federal policies or interests.6 The other
approach, used more frequently today, attempts to increase judicial power through the imposition of prudential judge-made limitations upon congressionally created jurisdictional statutes.7 By refusing to hear cases that technically are within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts but that do not invoke significant federal interests, the dilution of judicial power is minimized through judicial
restraint, and the legitimacy of the judicial branch is preserved." In
recent years, however, the Burger Court has rendered inconsistent
jurisdictional decisions in habeas corpus 9 and adequate and independent state grounds 0 cases, thereby undermining the foundation
upon which broad federal jurisdiction is based.11
6

To establish legitimacy, the early Supreme Court broadly defined its powers under

the Constitution and the first Judiciary Act. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 820-23 (1824) (power of judiciary is necessarily co-extensive with
power of legislative branch); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342-43
(1816) (federal appellate jurisdiction not limited to cases containing federal questions that
arise in federal courts); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (establishing
Supreme Court power of judicial review). Specifically, Chief Justice Marshall contended
that federal jurisdiction could exist whenever a federal interest was at stake. See Osborn, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823. Chief Justice Marshall's theory of federal jurisdiction is broad because it requires only the potential of a federal issue to justify jurisdiction. See id. at 824;
see also M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
54-59 (1980) (discussion of various interpretations of Osborn).
7 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (federal court will not enjoin a
pending state criminal prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances); Skelly Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950) (to "arise under" the Constitution, federal
question must be affirmatively established in complaint); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (Court will not hear federal constitutional issue when difficult question of state law remains unresolved).
8 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481-84 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
' See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text. Until recently, the Supreme Court had
fostered easy access to claimants pursuing a federal forum when Congress had provided for
one, and when an issue of federal law was in question. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 242-43 (1972) (federal court in § 1983 action can grant injunction to stay proceeding
pending in state court); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) (habeas petitioner not denied
federal forum unless he deliberately waived state procedural rule).
10 See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. The Court generally has denied access
to a federal forum when a state decision may be based on an adequate state ground and
involves only an inchoate federal issue. See, e.g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 (22 Wall.) 590,
636 (1874) (adequate and independent state ground doctrine).
" See infra notes 131-144 and accompanying text. Both habeas corpus jurisdiction and
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine reflect the Court's interest in ensuring
that the federal Constitution has been at least minimally upheld without losing sight of the
goal of maintaining federal-state comity. See Note, The New Federalism:Toward a Principled Interpretationof the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 297 (1977) (Supreme
Court decisions represent minimum protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights); see
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This Note will address these two areas in which the Burger
Court has instituted unprecedented jurisdictional policies. First, in
discussing the adequate and independent state ground doctrine,
the Note will focus on recent precedent that permits Supreme
Court review whenever the grounds of a state case are not clearly
based in state law. Second, the Court's recent trend of constricting
federal habeas relief for state prisoners, in spite of the legislative
directive for broad federal collateral review, will be examined. The
Note will concentrate on the Court's unprecedented inclination toward upholding state procedural requirements regardless of the
substantive merits of the claim being considered. Finally, the Burger Court's policies in these areas will be assessed in light of the
theories underlying federal jurisdiction and this Note will conclude
that a more prudential policy is essential to maintain the legitimacy of the Court as an institution.
THE ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT STATE GROUND DOCTRINE

Until recently, in deciding whether to review a state case when
it is unclear if the state court has rendered its decision primarily
on state or federal constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court had
either dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,12 granted a continuance to obtain clarification from the state court,13 or, most frequently, vacated the decision and remanded it to the state. 4 In the
also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter)
(habeas relief must be broad to ensure constitutionality of incarceration); Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (adequate and independent state ground doctrine protects state
courts from "unwitting interference").
12 See, e.g., Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934) (federal ground must appear
affirmatively on record to establish Supreme Court jurisdiction in ambiguously grounded
state cases).
13 See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (continuance granted to allow
petitioner to obtain clarification from state court as to state ground of decision). The Court
advocated continuance and clarification as the easiest means of assuring deference to state
courts without renouncing federal review when it is proper. See id.; see also Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 276 (1979) (dictum) (Court could remand for clarification if ambiguity existed);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 583 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (case should be remanded to Ohio court for clarification of basis of decision). Under the
continuance method, the state court judgment remains intact and the burden of sustaining
review remains with the petitioner. See Comment, Michigan v. Long: Presumptive Federal
Appellate Jurisdiction over State Cases Containing Ambiguous Grounds of Decision, 69
IOWA L. REv. 1081, 1089 (1984).
"' See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 556 (1940). In National Tea,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota had determined that the graduated tax law of Minnesota
violated both the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 552. The Supreme Court of the
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past, considerations of comity and judicial restraint have caused
the Court to exercise its prudential power to constrict the boundaries of federal jurisdiction created by Congress when federal interests would not otherwise be furthered. 15 Since neither the Constitution nor Congress has authorized Supreme Court jurisdiction
over state cases presenting only the mere possibility of a federal
issue,' it is arguable that the traditional policy of denying review
United States would not review the case on the merits because there was "considerable
uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision." Id. at 555-56. The Court reasoned
that state courts should be free to review cases arising under the United States Constitution. Id. at 557. To achieve this jurisdictional balance, the Court vacated and remanded the
case to the state court. Id. The vacation method is expansive because, by shifting the burden of sustaining review onto the state court, the petitioner does not automatically lose. See
Comment, supra note 13, at 1088-89. The policy of vacating and remanding ambiguously
grounded state cases has been repeatedly followed by the Court. See, e.g., Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 241-42 (1978) (per curiam) (remanded to determine if decision of state court based on federal constitutional claims or on adequate and
independent state grounds); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 426 (1973)
(per curiam) (remanded to determine basis of decision of state court); Dixon v. Duffy, 344
U.S. 143, 146 (1952) (remanded to see if decision of state court based on adequate and
independent state grounds or on federal constitutional claims).
5 See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309
U.S. 551, 555, 557 (1940); Comment, supra note 13, at 1087; see also Berkemer v. McCarty,
104 S.Ct. 3138, 3154 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (Court should follow policy of
judicial restraint no matter how appealing constitutional issue may be). The adequate and
independent state ground doctrine may be viewed merely as a doctrine of judicial restraint
because § 1257 of Title 28 technically provides the Supreme Court with the power to review
state law cases when questions of federal constitutional law are at issue. See 28 U.S.C. §
1257(3) (1982). See generally J. NOWA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrruTIONAL

LAW

95

(2d ed. 1983) (state decision resting on an adequate non-federal ground is a concrete controversy rendering the federal decision moot rather than advisory). But cf. Vitiello, Independent and Adequate State Grounds: A Stone Unturned by Louisiana's Criminal Defense
Bar? 25 Loy. L. REV. 745, 753 (1979) (if Court reviews only federal question in an adequate
and independent state ground case, it would be rendering an advisory opinion). This view is
consistent With the principle that a federal court can review any case or controversy arising
under article III that involves a federal ingredient. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824); infra note 117 and accompanying text. However, the
Court has stated that Congress would have affirmatively granted the federal courts jurisdiction over cases with adequate and independent state grounds if Congress intended for the
federal courts to have such power. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 (22 Wall.) 590, 619 (1874).
Furthermore, when the ambiguity results from a potential misconstruction of the federal
Constitution as overly broad, the state case is not within the purview of § 1257(3), which
permits Supreme Court review only when an actual federal issue exists. See 28 U.S.C. §
1257(3) (1982) (certiorari may be granted when "any title, right, privilege or immunity is
specially set up or claimed under the Constitution"); infra note 133.
" See U.S. CONST. art. III;
supra note 5 and accompanying text. Supreme Court jurisdiction is based solely on a specific grant of authority under article III or a Congressional
grant of jurisdiction pursuant to article III. See US. CONST. art. III. Ambiguously grounded
state cases involving only the potential of a misunderstanding of federal law fall neither
within the enumerated grants of jurisdiction under article III nor within the broader "aris-
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of ambiguously grounded state decisions when no federal right has
been denied was a recognition by the Court of a lack of any authority to review such decisions. 7 Moreover, if the Court reviews a
state case that, upon clarification, could reveal an adequate
nonfederal ground of decision, and the state court on remand asserts that the decision rests solely on the state constitution, the
state court could reverse the outcome of the Supreme Court and
render the decision of the latter a mere advisory opinion. 18 The
adequate and independent state ground doctrine, as historically
applied, shielded the Court from rendering advisory opinions by
requiring concrete federal grounds for decision prior to invoking
federal judicial power."9
ing under" language. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672-73
(1950) (matter in controversy must actually arise under Constitution to establish jurisdiction of federal courts); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)
(plaintiff's cause of action, not an anticipated defense, must arise under Constitution); US.
CONST. art. III, § 2. Further, by restricting certiorari review of state cases to actual claims
under the federal Constitution, Congress implicitly has refused to extend Supreme Court
jurisdiction to state cases that involve only the possibility of a misconstruction of a federal
constitutional provision as overly broad. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982); infra note 133.
17 See, e.g., Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143, 146 (1952) (Court has no jurisdiction to review federal question if state judgment based on adequate state ground); Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (Court will not review state decision unless clear that it was not
decided on adequate and independent state ground); Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54
(1934) (fact that federal question was necessary to decision of state court essential to jurisdiction of Supreme Court). In Lynch, for example, the Court said that although the state
court's decision could be construed as resting on federal law, "jurisdiction cannot be
founded upon surmise." 293 U.S at 54. To establish federal jurisdiction, the federal ground
must appear affirmatively from the record. Id. The burden of proving that an adequate and
independent state ground did not exist is on the party trying to establish jurisdiction. See
Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 281 (1955) (Court must take "scrupulous care" that case
below was based on federal law).
18 See, e.g., State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 427 (S.D. 1984) (on remand, Supreme
Court determination not controlling on state court decision); see Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.
117, 126 (1945). As the ultimate authority on state law, a state court, on remand, can either
enter judgment or reinstate its prior opinion as controlling. R. HODDER-WILLIAMS, supra
note 2, at 110-12; see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). In South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553 (1983), the Supreme Court reversed the decision of a South Dakota court to suppress evidence of the refusal of a defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test. Id. at 566. The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the South Dakota Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. Id. On remand, the Supreme Court
of South Dakota implicitly overruled the United States Supreme Court by basing its decision on state constitutional privileges. State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d at 431. The South Dakota Court emphasized that the opinion of the Supreme Court was not controlling. Id. at
427-28.
19See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945). The Court has noted that its policy to
enforce the adequate and independent state ground doctrine "seems consistent with the
respect due the highest courts of states of the Union that they be asked rather than told
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In Michigan v. Long, 0 however, the Supreme Court recently
reformulated the adequate and independent state ground doctrine,
holding that unless an adequate nonfederal ground affirmatively
appears from the face of the record, an ambiguous state decision
can be reviewed on the merits without state clarification on remand.2 1 Under Long, even if no federal right has been denied, the
Supreme Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction provided that
the state court potentially may have founded its decision on a misapplication of federal law. 22 The Long Court criticized vacation
and continuance as inefficient and prone to cause delay, while rejecting dismissal as antithetical to the goal of uniformity of federal
law. 23 To remedy these defects, the Court determined that any ambiguity concerning whether a case could have been decided on an
independent state ground may be resolved as if the state had relied
what they have intended." Id. This policy protects the state courts from "unwitting interference," and, at the same time, protects the Supreme Court from "unwitting renunciation."
Id. Similarly, in Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940), the Court stated that
important federal issues should be adjudicated by the Court without encroaching on state
constitutional law. See id. at 557.
20 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
21 See id. at 3477-78. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Long Court determined
that the prior methods of deciding whether a case had an adequate nonfederal ground were
ad hoc and inconsistent. See id. at 3475. The Court stated: "[w]e merely assume that there
are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied
upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the state
court rested its decision primarily on federal law." Id. at 3476-77. As Justice O'Connor mentioned in a footnote, this new presumption was foreshadowed in two recent Burger Court
opinions. Id. at 3477 n.8. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court reviewed state cases that
discussed both federal and state issues. See 103 S. Ct. at 3477 n.8. In Prouse, the Court
based its decision to accept jurisdiction on its determination that the state rested its decision on a misinterpretation of federal constitutional provisions. See 440 U.S. at 652-53. Similarly, in Zacchini, the Court determined that the Ohio Supreme Court had based its holding on an erroneous understanding of federal law, and, thus, the Court reviewed the case on
the merits. See 433 U.S. at 568; see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 (1982) (fair
reading of case below indicated federal constitutional law as basis of decision).
22 See Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that in
cases in which the petitioner is a state official, the Court is being asked "to rule that the
state court interpreted federal rights too broadly and 'overprotected' the citizen." Id. The
purpose of the Court, however, should be to ensure that the federal rights of citizens have
been vindicated, not to control state constitutional lawmaking. See id.
22 Id. at 3475. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun noted the importance of uniformity in federal law, but criticized the Court's new approach as inefficient and likely to
cause advisory opinions. Id. at 3483 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, on the
other hand, contended that the "uniformity" argument was superfluous because the need
for uniformity would still exist in a state case based on an adequate nonfederal ground. Id.
at 3491-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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on federal constitutional law.24
As predicted by Justice Stevens, this drastic revision of the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine has been invoked
extensively when the state court has interpreted the state constitution to provide greater protection to its citizens than the federal
Constitution.2" The Long doctrine may therefore cause a prolifera24 Id. at 3475. Justice O'Connor stated that if the independent non-federal ground is
"not apparent from the four corners of the opinion," the Court will "accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so." Id. at 3475-76. This position is inconsistent
with Justice O'Connor's prior commitment to foster independence between the state and
federal court systems, and to foster comity through deference to the finality of state court
decisions. See O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between Federal and State Courts
from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 814-15 (1981).
25 See Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3490-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since Long, the Court has
granted certiorari in numerous cases in which the states have rendered judgments in favor
of their citizens. See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855-56 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g., 104 S. Ct.
2267, 2276-77 (1984) (state case may have been influenced by misconceptibn of federal law
but case remanded for lack of strong federal interest). The decision on the merits in Michigan v. Long, it is submitted, is illustrative of the recent tendency of the Court to narrow the
scope of constitutional liberties. See Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:
State Court Evasion in the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 433-34 (1974). In People v. Long,
413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed the conviction of the defendant, holding that a protective search permits
only a pat-down search of the individual and not a search of the passenger compartment of
his car. Id. at 472-73, 320 N.W.2d at 869-70. By accepting the case for review, the Supreme
Court was able to extend the power of the police by permitting a search of the passenger
compartment when a Terry protective search is in order. Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3480-81; see
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (police can conduct protective search of individual
upon reasonable suspicion that individual is armed and dangerous). The defendant's conviction was subsequently reinstated. See Long, 103. S. Ct. at 3483. Justice Stevens criticized
the majority's acceptance of jurisdiction, stating that "the final outcome of the state
processes offended no federal interest whatever. Michigan simply provided greater protection to one of its citizens than some other State might provide or, indeed, than this Court
might require throughout the country." See id. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, by
reaching the merits of a federal question in these cases, it is submitted that the Supreme
Court is infringing on the rights of a state to provide constitutional guarantees to its citizens
that exceed those provided by the United States Constitution.
During the Warren Court era, the states retreated from active state constitutional lawmaking. See Kelman, Foreword,Rediscovering the State Constitutional Bill of Rights, 27
WAYNE L. REv. 413, 413 (1981); Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State
ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1328 (1982). This retreat was the result of the
Warren Court's extension of individual liberties and the application of most of the Bill of
Rights to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972 Foreword: The State Constitution: A More than Adequate Nonfederal
Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 273-74 (1973); Note, supra, at 1328. The Burger Court's
dilution of Warren Court precedents and the hesitation of the Burger Court to protect individual liberties have renewed the interest of state courts to develop state constitutional law.
See Kelman, supra, at 413-14; Developments in the Law, supra, at 1331.
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tion of advisory opinions concerning state law.26 In fact, since the
state court can reinstate its decision on remand, the Burger Court's
exercise of jurisdiction over state cases involving merely a potential
misapprehension of federal constitutional law ensures that the
power to render the decisions of the Court advisory rests solely in
the hands of state court judges.17 Since the advisory opinion doctrine has long been perceived as arising from article III to protect
the power and legitimacy of the Supreme Court, any doctrine that
increases the risk of advisory opinions drains the authority of the
Court and impairs the federal judicial power.2 8 Federal power is
26 See Comment, supra note 13, at 1095. In general, the Court has traditionally denied
review on the merits unless an adequate non-federal ground did not exist. See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940) (uncertainty as to basis of state court
decision was sufficient grounds for Supreme Court to deny review).
27 Cf. Comment, supra note 13, at 1095 (when state reinstates its own judgment, Supreme Court has engaged in unnecessary adjudication). State court judges already have
demonstrated that they will not hesitate to exercise the power to render the Supreme
Court's opinion advisory. See, e.g., State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 427-28 (S.D. 1984)
(although federal cases may be persuasive regarding interpretation of state constitution,
state courts are final authorities); see also State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-32, 471 A.2d 347,
350 (1983) (asserting right of state to interpret its own constitution more protectively than
federal Constitution); cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (expression of concern for Supreme Court encroachment into areas reserved for
state judges). According to some commentators, the principles of federalism demand that a
state court review its own constitutional provisions before resorting to the guidelines that
the Supreme Court has set for the federal Constitution. Falk, supra note 25, at 285; Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 1329. Even prior to Michigan v. Long, state courts
rebelled against Supreme Court opinions reversing state court holdings that construed constitutional guarantees more broadly than the Supreme Court would prefer. Note, supra note
11, at 297. It is not surprising, therefore, that the reaction of the states to Michigan v. Long
has been less than receptive. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 261 (Mont. 1983)
(Sheehy, J., dissenting) ("[t]he United States Supreme Court has no business contravening
the final decisions of a state judiciary where no federal right guaranteed to all citizens has
been offended").
28 See Comment, supra note 13, at 1095-96 (Long presumption presents the "greatest
likelihood of unnecessary adjudication and advisory opinions"). The Pullman abstention
doctrine offers support for the proposition that the Court should defer to the states in cases
involving uncertain grounds of decision in order to preserve its authority. See Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). In Pullman, a federal equity claim had
properly been brought before a district court with a pendent state claim that had not been
heard in the state court. Id. at 497-98. The Court adopted a policy of judicial restraint by
reasoning that the resolution of constitutional issues should be avoided when "a definitive
ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy." Id. at 498. Writing for the court,
Justice Frankfurter argued that the jurisdiction of a federal court would be undermined if
the federal court's determination could be overturned by a subsequent state adjudication.
Id. at 500. "The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court." Id.; see also H.J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 93 (1973) (federal decision when state law is unclear
would waste judicial resources and drain comity).
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further reduced by filling the Supreme Court docket with nonjusticiable questions, leaving less time to resolve cases invoking significant federal interests.2 9 Moreover, despite the reputation of the
Burger Court for protecting federal-state comity,3 0 the Long doctrine, by increasing the pool of state cases available for federal appellate review, interferes with the inherent power of a state court
to interpret its own constitution."' Finally, although the Long
Court criticized earlier decisions for impairing judicial economy
through continuance or vacation and remand, 2 more judicial time
is wasted by adjudicating a matter that already has been deter29 See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
swollen docket of the Supreme Court is another reason why the state courts should actively
function as state constitutional lawmakers. See Sheran, State Courts and Federalismin the
1980's: Comment, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 789, 792-93 (1981); see also H.J. FRIENDLY, supra
note 28, at 3-4 (federal courts are faced with a breakdown because of increased workload
and increased interference into state affairs); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410
U.S. 425, 429 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Court should not expand jurisdiction over
state cases because of already large docket).
30Cf. Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil
Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REv. 29, 61-62
(1979) (Burger Court may have expanded comity in civil areas as well as criminal). But see
Wilkes, supra note 25, at 433-34 ("Burger Court will not hesitate to set aside state judgments that expand federal rights beyond the limits thought desirable by the Burger Court").
31 See Comment, supra note 13, at 1099. State courts are not required to interpret state
constitutions in the same manner that the Supreme Court has construed the federal Constitution. See Falk, supra note 25, at 283 n.39; Note, supra note 11, at 297. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted several times that a state constitution can confer greater rights and
protections than the federal Constitution, especially in criminal matters. See, e.g., Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (state free to impose greater restrictions on police activity
than those Supreme Court deems necessary); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)
(state may impose stricter standards on searches and seizures than those required by federal
Constitution). Thus, Supreme Court precedents should be considered merely persuasive authority by state judges when construing state constitutions. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226,
233, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (1983); State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 427-28 (S.D. 1984); Falk,
supra note 25, at 283. The adequate and independent state ground doctrine is not inconsistent with the principle that federal law must govern when there is a conflict between state
and federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. The Supremacy Clause, however, does not require federal courts to accept jurisdiction
over all cases involving federal questions. See id.; Bator, supra note 3, at 633. Bator argues
that "it is worth reminding ourselves that the supremacy clause does not say that the federal government shall be supreme. It doesn't even say that the federal courts shall be supreme. It says, fundamentally, that the Constitution shall be supreme." Bator, supra note 3,
at 633 (emphasis in original).
31 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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mined under state law, or that will be rendered federally moot by a
subsequent state decision on remand. 3
The Long decision erases the benefits of the earlier adequate
and independent state ground doctrine, 4 fails to further any of the
policies that it purports to promote,3 5 and increases the risk of advisory opinions.36 It is therefore suggested that the Court should
dismiss those cases in which an adequate and independent state
ground arguably exists, but federally guaranteed constitutional
rights are at least minimally upheld. 7 The Court should accept review, however, when an adequate and independent state ground
may exist, but the decision of the state court impinges on the petitioner's guaranteed rights as protected by the United States Constitution. 8 If a state court may have misinterpreted federal constitutional law, but the grounds of decision are too obscure to
determine if a federal right has been denied, it is submitted that
the probability that an adequate and independent state ground
does not exist should be weighed against the likelihood of a misconstruction of federal constitutional law. When the state court
opinion analyzes interpretations of federal constitutional law in
contravention of the recognized understanding of the Supreme
Court, without reference to any state constitutional provision that
would render the same result, the Court should grant a continuance and seek clarification.39 However, if the state court acknowl" See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3490 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Comment, supra
note 13, at 1093, 1095.
4 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
6 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
'7 Even when a federal issue appears in a state case, the Supreme Court should not
take jurisdiction unless the state ground is insufficient. See Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52,
54-55 (1934). But cf. Comment, supra note 13, at 1091 (since Minnesota v. National Tea
Co., 324 U.S. 551 (1940), the Court has not dismissed cases unless the probability of jurisdiction is low). A federal forum should be made available only when a fair state forum is
unavailable. Bator, supra note 3, at 626. Since state courts are the "ultimate protection
against tyrannous government," it is imprudent for the federal courts to usurp their power.
Id. at 629; cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2090-91 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (states "remain the primary guardian of the liberty of the people").
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982) (appellate jurisdiction is available for any claim specifically set up under Constitution).
-1 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 583 (1977)

(Stevens, J., dissenting) (when basis of state court action unclear, case should be remanded
for clarification before deciding constitutional issue); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126-28
(1945) (continuance should be granted to allow state court to clarify its decision). Continuing a case for clarification achieves the goal of deference to state constitutional lawmaking.
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edges a state constitutional right that is analogous to a federal constitutional right, there is no reason for the Supreme Court to
intrude upon the judgment of the state court.4 ° This approach is
consistent with the goal of federal-state comity because it not only
allows the state courts the freedom to be the final arbiters of their
own constitutions,4 1 but also credits state judges with the ability to
determine constitutional issues. 42 In addition, it will help to reinstate an original function of the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine; namely, to minimize dilution of the federal judicial power and thereby maximize the Court's authority and
legitimacy.4"
Pitcairn,324 U.S. at 126-28. The continuance method maintains the Court's power because
the Court can hear the case on the merits upon being informed by the state that the state
decision was based on federal law. See id. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts to interpret federal law, see id. at 127; thus, an alternative approach would be
for the Court to vacate and remand the case to the state court, see California v. Krivda, 409
U.S. 33, 35 (1972) (per curiam); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 556 (1940).
The state court could then reinterpret the federal law, or provide greater protections by
interpreting the state constitution. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation
v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 104 S. Ct. 2267, 2278-79 (1984) (Supreme Court remanded case to state
court for reinterpretation of state law); cf. State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 427 (S.D. 1984)
(state court based decision on state constitution after remand from Supreme Court).
10 See Jankovitch v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 489-92 (1965); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945); Parks v. State, 666 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(Levy, J., dissenting); see also S. Pollack, Remarks at United States Law Week's Annual
Constitutional Law Conference (Sept. 14-15, 1984) (summary available in 53 U.S.L.W. 2187,
2194 (Oct. 16, 1984)) (judgment of state court should not be questioned if based upon state
constitution).
"ISee J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 20-21. Although some state
court actions are reviewable by the Supreme Court pursuant to § 1257 of Title 28, the state
courts are still the final arbiters of state law. Id. It is important for state courts to take an
active role in state constitutional lawmaking to preserve their independence and keep the
process of dispute resolution as close to the people as possible. Sheran, supra note 29, at
799; see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[s]tates in our
federal system... remain the primary guardian of the people"); Bator, supra note 3, at 636
(state courts should be involved in constitutional lawmaking as enforcers of the law); Note,
Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J.
1694, 1700 (1981) (implementation of popularly desired policy goals more likely when government close to people).
42 See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (acknowledging concurrent jurisdiction of states to interpret Constitution); cf. Sheran, supra note 29, at 792 (many programs
have improved quality of state court judges).
13 Cf. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945) (clarification from state court is simplest procedure for dealing with ambiguously grounded cases); Minnesota v. National Tea
Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) ("[i]ntelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to
ask for the elimination of obscurities and ambiguities from opinions in such cases"); Lynch
v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934) (Court should not take jurisdiction when ground of
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The federal habeas corpus statute enables a person convicted
by a state court to have his case reviewed by a federal court to
determine if he is being held in violation of the federal Constitution.44 During the. years of the Warren Court, habeas corpus petitions were encouraged on the ground that "federal constitutional
rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest
opportunity for plenary judicial review."4 5 Due in part to the Warren Court's expansion of habeas jurisdiction, the Burger Court has
severely restricted the availability of federal habeas review of state
convictions. 48 The constriction has been greatest in the area of
decision is nonfederal).
4'See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). Section 2254(a) provides that:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
Id.
Prior to the 1867 amendments to the Judiciary Act, federal habeas corpus relief was
available only to those held in federal custody. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 221 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (brief summary of the 1867 amendments to the Judiciary Act).
The Court sanctioned the congressional grant of authority to the federal courts to review
state cases in which the petitioner is being held in violation of federal law. See Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249 (1886). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 330-46 (2d ed.
1983) (summary of history and important case law).
'1 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) (habeas corpus relief must be granted unless
prisoner has "deliberately bypassed" state court proceedings); see Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 316-17 (1963) (habeas corpus relief should be granted if new facts would vindicate
defendant); S. WAsBY, Tn SuPRE&E COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYsTEM 141-42 (1984);
Nichol, Backing into the Future: The Burger Court and the Federal Forum, 30 U. KAN. L.
R.v. 341, 356-57 (1982); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (Habeas Corpus
Act requires broad federal review). The Fay and Townsend decisions permitted the review
of federal constitutional claims unless the petitioner intentionally violated a procedural rule.
Annot., 96 F.R.D. 437, 522 (1983). The Warren Court's expansion of the writ of habeas
corpus opened the door of the federal courthouse to state petitioners seeking protection of
their constitutional rights. See Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1042 (1977). The Warren Court stressed that a habeas
claim exists whenever federal law has been incorrectly decided, regardless of the fairness of
the litigation. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 427; Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas CorpusRelitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 592-93 (1982).
46 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (criticizing Fay for encouraging
"sandbagging" and for not deferring to state procedural rules); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 478-80 (1976) (Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), was decided without
proper consideration of nature of fourth amendment); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 252-58 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (criticizing historical analysis of habeas function
in Fay); see S. WASBY, supra note 45, at 142; Nichol, supranote 45, at 357-58; The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REv. 212, 217 & n.1; Comment, Habeas Corpus-Limiting
the Availability of Habeas Corpus After a ProceduralDefault, 73 J. CRis. L. & CRIMINOL-
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fourth amendment rights.4 7 In this context, a state prisoner is precluded from seeking habeas relief if he previously has been afforded an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of his fourth
amendment claim in state court.4 8 This standard forecloses any
meaningful federal review of fourth amendment violations by the
states.4 9 Since the habeas corpus statute requires a petitioner to
exhaust all state remedies before coming into federal court,50 a
state prisoner inevitably will have fully litigated his fourth amendment claim in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.5 1 By
denying a federal remedy explicitly provided by Congress, the
Court has attempted "to rewrite [a] jurisdictional statute . . ..
and, therefore, has encroached on the powers reserved to the legislature by the United States Constitution.2
OGY 1612, 1627 (1982); see also Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 355 (1983) (Nixon appointees to Court opposed expansion of habeas
relief). But see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("no rational lawyer would
risk . . . 'sandbagging' ").
47 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (state prisoner cannot obtain habeas
relief based on claim that exclusionary rule should have applied to certain evidence at trial);
see also id. at 503, 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Stone is foundation for further minimization of habeas relief).
48 Id. at 494. In Stone, the Court reasoned that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule would not be diminished by the denial of habeas corpus relief. Id. at 493. Rather, the
Court feared that overturning a criminal conviction on collateral relief after two tiers of
state courts had rejected a fourth-amendment claim could create disrespect for the law and
the administration of justice. Id. at 491. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan contended
that the majority did not focus on a crucial point in the case-the availability of a federal
forum to redress federal constitutional violations. Id. at 503, 511-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982) (federal court "shall entertain" habeas petitions for
constitutional violations).
Because the federal judiciary is protected by life tenure and a guaranteed salary, federal
judges are immunized from the political pressures that may persuade a state court judge to
"bend" the Constitution to avoid controversial issues. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1; see also
Stone, 428 U.S. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("detached federal review is a salutary safeguard"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469-71 (A. Hamilton) (1966) (tenure and salary protections of federal judiciary ensure preservation of constitutional rights); Bator, supra note 3,
at 623 (prestige, expertise, tenure, and salary of federal judges result in greater sensitivity to
federal rights).
49 See Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 749 (8th Cir.) (Bright, J., dissenting) (Stone
deprived prisoner of opportunity to have his constitutional claim reviewed by a federal
court), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977); Comment, Development of FederalHabeas Corpus
Since Stone v. Powell, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 1145, 1165; cf. United States ex. rel. Petillo v. New
Jersey, 562 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1977) (whether fourth-amendment issue was decided correctly by state court is irrelevant in light of Stone).
50 See infra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
"I See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1982); infra note 91.
52 See Stone, 428 U.S. at 503-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also Saltzburg, Habeas
Corpus: The Supreme Court and Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367, 368 (1983) (Congress, not
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The Burger Court, however, has placed further restrictions on
habeas relief that affect the availability of habeas review regardless
53
of the substantive basis of the petitioner's federal claim. Most
notably, a state prisoner can no longer obtain habeas relief if he
has committed a procedural default during the course of the state
proceedings against him, unless a vague and restrictive "cause and
prejudice" test is met. 4 A habeas petitioner is also precluded from
plenary federal review if he has failed to exhaust all available state
remedies with respect to any one claim in his petition. 55
State ProceduralDefaults
In Fay v. Noia,5 6 the Warren Court recognized that, in limited
instances, a habeas petitioner's failure to comply with a state pro57
cedural rule could constitute grounds for dismissal of the writ.
The Warren Court, while concerned primarily with providing impartial federal review of alleged constitutional violations by a
state,58 recognized a federal responsibility to avoid undue interferthe Court, should be weighing competing policy considerations involved in controversy over
scope of habeas jurisdiction); cf. Remington, State PrisonerAccess to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal Courts: An Increasingly Important Role for State
Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 300 (1983) (Court's habeas decisions reflect policies of "oft
rejected proposal[s] to Congress").
13 Stone, 428 U.S. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Remington, supranote 52, at
287-88; Rosenn, supra note 46, at 362.
See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105
(1980) (failure to get habeas relief collaterally estops petitioners in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action).
But cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1965) (Court will defer to state only
when petitioner has not substantially complied with a legitimate state procedure).
13 See infra note 94.
56 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
17 See id. at 438-40.
58 See id. at 422-24. By extending the habeas remedy to state prisoners, and providing
for a trial of the facts anew, Congress designed a habeas remedy that was "additional to and
independent of direct Supreme Court review." See id. at 415-16; Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86 (1867); see also Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26
(1867) (amendment to habeas statute broadens habeas jurisdiction to cover every constitutional violation); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statutory extension of
habeas corpus enlarges liberties). See generally Peller, supra note 45, at 610-44 (historical
perspective of Habeas Corpus Act and cases interpreting Act require broad federal collateral
review). Arguably, the federal interests compelling habeas review necessitate habeas jurisdiction that is more extensive than appellate jurisdiction of state'cases. Compare Fay, 372
U.S. at 429-33 (interest of state in compliance with an important and legitimate procedural
rule is irrelevant in habeas proceeding) with Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-47
(1965) (adequate and independent state procedural ground may preclude federal appellate
review when state asserts legitimate reason for compliance). Indeed, the right of an individual to habeas corpus relief is specifically enumerated in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I,
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ence with state court proceedings. 59 Thus, the Fay Court held that
unless a state prisoner's failure to comply with a state procedural
rule was the result of a "deliberate bypass" of the rule by the prisoner for the purpose of "saving" the federal constitutional claim
for habeas review, a federal court should review the petition."0 The
deliberate bypass rule denied habeas review only to fully informed
state prisoners who intended to violate state court procedural
rules.6 1
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 2 the Burger Court explicitly rejected
the deliberate bypass standard, holding that, absent "cause and
prejudice," a petitioner who, knowingly or not, fails to comply with
any state court procedural rule will be denied federal habeas review on the merits.6 3 Thus, even when the interest of the state in
§ 9, cl. 2 ("[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it").
19 See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) (Court will defer to adequate and
independent state procedural ground when there is legitimate state reason for compliance).
But see Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (Court will not defer to state
procedural requirement that is not applied fairly). While the Henry Court acknowledged
that the adequate and independent state ground doctrine applied to both state substantive
and procedural grounds, the Court noted that adherence to the doctrine was less compelling
when the state court decision was based on a state procedural ground. Henry, 379 U.S. at
446-47. Accordingly, the Court concluded that to ensure the vindication of constitutionally
guaranteed rights in such cases, federal appellate review should not be forfeited unless the
state has a legitimate interest in preserving the important state procedural rule that has
been waived. See id. But cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-27 (1963) (because it is intended
as remedy for unconstitutional restraint, habeas corpus jurisdiction cannot be diminished by
anything that may occur in state court proceeding). Furthermore, although a state procedural rule is arguably legitimate, a federal forum will not be forfeited by the petitioner if he
complied substantially with an alternate, legitimate rule. See Henry, 379 U.S. at 448-49.
60 372 U.S. at 438. In Pay, the petitioner applied for federal habeas relief although he
had not made a timely appeal in state court, resulting in an unexhausted claim. Id. at 39496. The Court noted that the doctrines of comity and finality should not outweigh the prisoner's right to a federal forum to hear his constitutional claim. See id. at 419-20, 424. Thus,
unless the petitioner himself, not his lawyer, deliberately bypassed the state procedural rule,
habeas jurisdiction would be granted. See id. at 439. But see Sallet & Goodman, Closing the
Door to Federal Habeas Corpus:A Comment on Legislative Proposals to Restrict Access in
State ProceduralDefault Cases, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 465, 470 (1983) (requiring deliberate
bypass by prisoner himself nearly always results in waiver).
0" See Fay, 372 U.S. at 439.
62 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
63 See id. at 87-88. In Sykes, a state prisoner was denied habeas corpus relief because of
his failure to comply with the contemporaneous-objection rule of Florida. Id. at 85-86. The
Court adopted the "cause and prejudice" test of Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542
(1976), which held that a petitioner must show why the state procedural rule was not complied with and that the loss of opportunity resulting from such noncompliance actually
prejudiced the defendant's trial. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91. The Court then remanded the
case to the district court to dismiss the writ because the petitioner had not explained his
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enforcing the bypassed rule is weak, the Burger Court is foregoing
federal jurisdiction without examining the validity of the substantive federal claim.e4
While the Sykes case shifted the burden of proof regarding
habeas jurisdiction to the petitioner e5 two subsequent opinions,
6 and United States v. Frady,67 have placed
Engle v. Isaac"
further
demands on habeas petitioners by broadly defining what will not
constitute "cause" and "prejudice." ' In Isaac, after the petitioners
were imprisoned the Ohio Supreme Court reinterpreted the state
constitution, changing the burden of proof regarding self-defense.6 9
The petitioners argued that they had "cause" for failing to comply
with a state contemporaneous objection rule, since at the time of
the state trial a constitutional violation did not yet exist.7° Alfailure to object at trial and because other evidence of guilt against the petitioner was substantial. Id. The Sykes Court, however, did not define the meaning of "cause" and
"prejudice," deferring such clarification to later cases. See id. at 91.
The cause and prejudice standard was first applied to restrict habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) when an attorney of a federal prisoner failed to demonstrate cause for
and prejudice resulting from failure to object to the composition of a grand jury prior to
trial. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242-43 (1973). Based on considerations of
comity, the Court subsequently applied the cause and prejudice standard to state convicts
applying for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). See Francis,425 U.S. at 541-42. But see
id. at 545-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority has repudiated deliberate bypass standard
of Fay v. Noia and has ignored legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)).
Cf. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 100 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("federal courts possess the
power to look beyond a state procedural forfeiture") (emphasis in original). Denying review
of the merits because of an inadvertent procedural forfeiture implicitly contravenes the statutory language mandating fact-finding by the federal court hearing the petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) (federal court shall review facts anew when state fact-finding process is inadequate).
65Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (creating presumption against waiver
unless court is convinced that petitioner deliberately bypassed a state procedure) with
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1976) (defendant must show "cause" for a procedural
default before habeas claim will be reviewed on the merits).
6 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
67 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
11 See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
69456 U.S. at 111. When the respondents were initially tried, the Ohio courts had required a defendant asserting self-defense to prove this defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. See id. at 110. After the respondents were convicted, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that a defendant had the burden of production, not persuasion, with regard to a claim
of self-defense. Id. at 111; see State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 109-10, 351 N.E.2d 88,
93-94 (1976). Isaac appealed his conviction based on the intervening change in the law.
Isaac, 456 U.S. at 115. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Isaac's claim because he had failed
to object at trial. Id. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of jurisdiction,
holding that Isaac had met the "cause" requirement since an objection at trial would have
been futile. Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
70 456 U.S. at 129-31.
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though the petitioners' counsel were not expected to predict future
changes in the law, the Isaac Court nevertheless denied the writ,
holding that cause was not established by the mere "futility of
presenting an objection to the state courts." 7' 1 In Frady, a case involving a habeas petition by a federal prisoner, the Court held that
the petitioner failed to show actual "prejudice" because he had not
presented any colorable evidence indicating that the trier of facts
might reverse the outcome of the case. 2
Sykes, Isaac, and Frady combine to reveal an unprecedented
deference to state court procedural rules by the Burger Court." In
other jurisdictional contexts, the Court has recognized the
supremacy of federal law unless the federal court is interfering
with state substantive law.74 Recognizing the important federal interest of providing a federal forum when a claim involves litigants
from different states," the Court has construed broadly its congressionally granted rulemaking authority so that litigants from
different states are ensured uniform procedure in a federal court.7 6
11 Id. In a recent decision, Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), the Court held that the
novelty of a constitutional issue at-the time of the state court action could establish cause,
id. at 2910. The durability of this slight retreat from Isaac is questionable, however, since
the plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was joined by only three justices. See id.
at 2912, 2913. See generally Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory
Action by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 58 (1982) (precedential
effect of decision diminished when justices do not agree on given result for same reasons).
7'2 456 U.S. at 171. Writing for the Frady Court, Justice O'Connor rejected the petitioner's contention that the "plain error" standard in Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be applied to his case. Id. at 166-67; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b)
("[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the Court"); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973)
(when petitioner's challenge to imprisonment could be brought under habeas corpus statute,
habeas corpus requirements cannot be circumvented by a claim under the Civil Rights Act).
73 See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 136 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Comment,
supra note 46, at 1622; infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text; cf. Remington, supra note
52, at 299-300 (suggesting that even adequacy of state procedure is unimportant as long as
claim has been litigated in state court). The constant outcry of politicians and the public
alike is that the courts have been too lenient in letting criminals go free due to procedural
technicalities. See generally E. Wright, Court at the Crossroads,Time Mag., Oct. 8, 1984, at
33, col. 2, 3. But cf. Bator, supra note 3, at 623 (federal courts should be immune from
political pressures). It is suggested that the procedural barriers raised by the Burger Court
have swung the pendulum so far that the unjustly incarcerated may no longer be freed due
to procedural technicalities.
74 See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
7' See C. WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 23, at 128.
7 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-74 (1965). When Congress formulates a
rule that rationally is capable of classification as a procedural rule, it is deemed constitutional and will be enforced unless it interferes with state substantive law. See id.
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Specifically, a state procedural rule is applied in a diversity case
only if the application of the state rule would yield a different outcome than if federal law were applied. 7 Similarly, by granting the
federal judiciary the broad power to pursue fresh facts in habeas
cases, Congress has demonstrated a distrust of the ability of state
courts to provide adequate federal constitutional guarantees to
state prisoners,7 and has conferred upon the federal courts the responsibility to preserve the important federal interest of vindicat9
ing the rights of those who are unjustly imprisoned.7 It is suggested that this significant federal interest clearly outweighs the
weak state interest of ease in state judicial administration. Nevertheless, by requiring the habeas petitioner to negotiate a maze of
procedural barriers before his constitutional claim can be heard on
the merits, the Court has placed the interests of comity and deference to state judicial administration above the strong federal interest of vindicating constitutional violations.8 0
It is submitted that the restrictive definitions of "cause" and
"prejudice" adopted by the Court have resulted in a substantial
injustice, possibly of constitutional dimensions to the petitioner.
Even in cases of fundamental unfairness, the Isaac "cause" standard traps the habeas petitioner by denying him habeas relief
when his "astute counsel" overlooks an esoteric constitutional
claim."' By denying habeas relief premised on the inadvertent error of an attorney that does not even reach the level of a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the restrictive
cause standard precludes the petitioner from relief without regard
77 See id. at 469; M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 177.
78 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9, 415-16 (1963)

(expansion of habeas corpus act

to state prisoners was passed in anticipation of post-Civil War abuses); Peller, supra note
45, at 619 (Congress passed 1867 Act to enforce newly created federal rights).
71 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953); see also Peller, supra note 45, at 618

(language of 1867 Act requires broad federal collateral review).

"' See Remington, supra note 52, at 299-300; Rosenn, supra note 46, at 362.

81 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-34 (1982). The current Ohio rule on the burden of

proving self-defense had not yet been pronounced by the Ohio courts at the time of the
defendant's procedural default. Id. at 110-11. The Supreme Court determined that the petitioner's counsel should have relied on the general due process standards of In re Winship.
Id. at 131, 133. In Winship, the Court held that a defendant cannot be convicted except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the charge against him. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Based on the Winship decision, the Isaac Court found
that the petitioner's attorney had the "tools" to raise the constitutional claim at the time of

trial. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 133. The Court recognized that not every attorney would have
gleaned this tenuous connection, yet declared that the Constitution did not guarantee "as-

tute counsel." Id. at 134; see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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to the substance of his claim. 2 To avoid this result, the petitioner's
attorney will be encouraged to raise every possible constitutional
claim in state court, thereby hindering comity by overloading state
courts with a plethora of potentially meritless claims. s3 Finally, by
requiring the petitioner to present a "colorable claim of innocence"
to meet the actual prejudice standard of Frady,8 4 the Court has
implicitly overruled In re Winship85 by shifting the burden of
proof from the prosecutor to the defendant.8
It is suggested that the Court reinstate the Fay "deliberate
bypass" standard, accompanied in certain instances by a showing
of fundamental unfairness. To protect the petitioner's right to a
federal forum, neither the petitioner nor his attorney may knowingly forego an important state procedural rule as a tactical means
of obtaining access to a federal forum.87 If the petitioner's attorney
'2 See Remington, supra note 52, at 297; Sallet & Goodman, supra note 60, at 481; cf.
Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change
in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 436, 467 (1980) ("Wainwright seemingly mandates the continued incarceration of factually innocent defendants in order to deter defense
attorney misconduct").
83 See Remington, supra note 52, at 297 n.47. Aware of the impropriety of punishing
habeas petitioners for the ministerial errors of their attorneys, the Court has retreated
slightly from the procedurally difficult cause standard. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901,
2910 (1984) (defendant has "cause" when legal basis of a constitutional claim is "not reasonably available to counsel").
0'
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170-71 (1982). The notion that a habeas petitioner should include a colorable claim of innocence in his petition was espoused by Judge
Friendly. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 160 (1970) (defendant must show fair probability that alleged error
would have raised reasonable question of doubt about his guilt in mind of trier of facts).
The Burger Court has relied explicitly on Judge Friendly's argument. See Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 126 & n.31 (1982); see also Peller, supra note 45, at 593 (Supreme Court
supports colorable claim of innocence requirement); Seidman, supra note 82, at 449-59 &
n.69 (same).
83 397 U.S. 358 (1970). For a brief discussion of the Winship case, see supra note 81.
88 See Sallet & Goodman, supra note 60, at 478; Comment, Lundy, Isaac & Frady. A
Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32 CAT. U.L. REV. 169, 215 (1983). It is axiomatic that
the prosecutor is required to prove each and every element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see supra note 81.
87 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-40 (1963) (habeas relief should be precluded
when petitioner "deliberately by-passed" a state procedural ground); see also United States
ex rel. Allurn v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1973) (criticizing requirement that
client participate in every tactical decision of competent counsel); Sallet & Goodman, supra
note 60, at 481 (criminal defendants must sometimes be bound to their attorneys' decisions);
cf. Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984) (federal courts are empowered to go beyond
procedural forfeiture to protect constitutional rights); Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1364
(10th Cir. 1981) (non-deliberate attorney error may constitute "cause"); Rachel v.
Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204 (6th Cir. 1978) (inexperience of attorney constitutes
"cause"). Requiring the dismissal of a habeas claim when there has been a deliberate bypass
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deliberately bypassed a legitimate state procedural rule, the petitioner should still be permitted to obtain habeas relief if the effect
of the procedural default resulted in fundamental unfairness."
Specifically, the effect of a procedural default is fundamentally unfair when the petitioner loses his opportunity to raise a claim that
could have swayed the trier of facts when deciding the issue of
guilt. " This two-prong approach ensures a habeas petitioner a federal remedy for actual constitutional abuses while limiting access
to a federal forum only to meritorious claims.90
Exhaustion of State Remedies
The Federal Judiciary Act requires a petitioner for a writ of
habeas corpus to exhaust all reasonably available state remedies
before applying for the writ." The exhaustion requirement is inof an important state rule fosters comity by deferring to state procedure when the state has
a legitimate reason for compliance with the rule. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447
(1965); see also Sallet & Goodman, supra note 60, at 476-78 (adequacy and independence of
state procedural ground is threshold issue).
88 See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 136 & n.1 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (procedural foreclosure of federal habeas relief should result only
when petitioner has received fundamentally fair trial); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 547-48
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (habeas relief should be confined to cases truly involving
fundamental unfairness); cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("if the constitutional issue is sufficiently grave, even an express waiver by the defendant himself may sometimes be excused"). By requiring the petitioner to make an additional showing of fundamental unfairness if his attorney deliberately bypassed a state
procedure, the possibility of "sandbagging" is reduced. Cf. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89 (requiring
dismissal only when petitioner himself deliberately bypasses state procedure encourages
sandbagging). "Sandbagging" occurs when a petitioner's attorney delays raising a constitutional issue in the state court for the purpose of saving the claim for a federal habeas proceeding if the petitioner loses in state court. Id.
" See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 542 n.7 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 136 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claim merely attaching "constitutional label" to habeas petition should be
denied); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02, 438-39 (1963) (individual entitled to immediate
release from unconstitutional imprisonment unless he has deliberately waived such right).
91 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1982). The exhaustion requirement provides:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of
the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State .... if he has the right under the law of the State to
raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
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tended to foster comity and to preserve the role of the state court
in enforcing federal law.9 2 Recently, in Rose v. Lundy,9 the Supreme Court interpreted these subsections of the habeas statute to
preclude federal habeas corpus relief when the petition contains
both exhausted and unexhausted claims. 4 Lundy confronts the
habeas petitioner with two choices when he presents such a mixed
petition to the district court: he may return to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims or he may remove the unexhausted
claims from the petition and proceed to federal court.9 5 The Lundy
92 See Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam) (exhaustion requirement
of § 2254(b) and (c) "serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of
justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights"); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A180 (1947)
(citing Ex parteHawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944)); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515,
518 (1982) ("exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in
the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings"); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973) (exhaustion doctrine balances
interests of federalism with need to preserve writ of habeas corpus).
455 U.S. 509 (1982).
Id. at 510, 518-19. A habeas petition containing claims that have already been exhausted in the state court, as well as claims that have not been determined by the state
court, is deemed a mixed petition. See id. at 510. The "total exhaustion" rule necessitates
the dismissal of such a petition. See id.
Prior to Rose v. Lundy, there had been a split among the circuit courts over the disposition of mixed habeas petitions. Id. at 513 n.5. Compare Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d
348, 355 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring total exhaustion) and Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807,
810 (9th Cir. 1976) (total exhaustion required unless prevented by reasonable circumstances) with Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 574 (1st Cir. 1980) (reviewing exhausted claims in
mixed petition) and Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1976) (same). While only
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have dismissed all claims in mixed petitions, no circuit has
accepted such petitions when the unexhausted claims were interwoven with, or pertinent to,
the resolution of the exhausted claims. See, e.g., Triplett v. Wyrick, 549 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (dismissal when exhausted claims "closely intertwined" with
unexhausted claims); United States ex rel. DeFlumer v. Mancusi, 380 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d
Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (claims so related as to require dismissal); cf. Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d
967, 969 (1st Cir. 1976) (accepting review of exhausted claims in mixed petition since such
claims were unrelated to unexhausted claims). See generally Casenote, Total Exhaustionof
State Remedies in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 24 B.C.L. Rav. 1339, 1341 (1983) (interwoven mixed petition logically requires simultaneous presentation of exhausted and
unexhausted claims). Even the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which advocated total exhaustion,
permitted review of the exhausted claims in mixed petitions when the district court had
mistakenly considered the exhausted claims, see, e.g., Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374,
376 (9th Cir. 1981) (review permitted because district court reached merits of exhausted
claim), or when the petitioner provided a reasonable explanation for his failure to exhaust,
see Lundy, 455 U.S. at 529 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Casenote, supra,at 1343. Lundy,
however, required that the "total exhaustion" rule be "rigorously enforced." 455 U.S. at 518.
11 Lundy, 455 U.S. at 510. In Lundy, the respondent had been convicted by a jury in a
Tennessee state court of rape and a crime against nature. Id. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review of the
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Court maintained that a total exhaustion requirement would advance both state and federal interests by fostering comity and finality, while
providing a more complete factual record for federal
6
9

review.

The Lundy plurality noted that a petitioner who drops an
unexhausted claim to proceed with his exhausted claims in federal
court might forfeit later federal review of his unexhausted claim
under Rule 9(b) of the habeas corpus statute.9 7 Rule 9(b) requires
case. Id. at 511 & n.2. The respondent also was denied relief by the Knox County Criminal
Court. Id. at 510. Subsequently, the respondent filed a habeas petition in federal district
court alleging four grounds of relief, including two that previously had not been exhausted
in the Tennessee courts. See id. at 511.
96 Id. at 518-19. According to Justice O'Connor, "[a] rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus
giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error." Id.
The Lundy Court determined that the "mixed petition" issue had not been addressed
by the statute itself, the legislative history, or pre-statutory case law. See id. at 515-17; Case
Note, A Federal District Court Must Dismiss in its Entirety A State Prisoner'sHabeas
Corpus Petition Containing Both Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims of Constitutional
Violations: Rose v. Lundy, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1982-1983). Consequently, the
Court based its decision on the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement. See Lundy,
455 U.S. at 516-20; Casenote, supra note 94, at 1344.
1 Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520-21 (dictum). Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, joined in Part mIC of the plurality opinion written by Justice O'Connor. Id. at
509. In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the plurality opinion misconstrued the purpose of the "abuse of the writ" sanction contained in Rule 9(b). Id. at 535 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent maintained that both the legislative
history of Rule 9(b) and case law indicate that the "abuse of the writ" doctrine should be
used to dismiss a case only when the petitioner has "knowingly" or "deliberately" abandoned or withheld claims that could have been included in the first petition. Id. at 534-36
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982); see also
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) advisory committee note (citing Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1963)) (petitioner's failure to assert all claims in original petition must be
"inexcusable").
Even without the "abuse of the writ" sanction, the pro se petitioner who is unaware of
his option to amend his petition is at a disadvantage. See Lundy, 455 U.S. at 530 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to FirstPrinciples,44 OHIO ST.L.J. 393, 435 (1983). But cf. Note, Rose
v. Lundy: The Supreme Court Adopts the Total Exhaustion Rule for Review of Mixed
Habeas Corpus Petitions, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 859, 879-80 (plurality's discussion of abuse of
the writ may result in delay due to broadening of the abuse standard by lower federal
courts); Note, Habeas Corpus - Much Ado About Very Little: The Total ExhaustionRule,
73 J. CRIhL L. & CIMINOLOGY 1641, 1648 (1982) (without "abuse of the writ" sanction, poli-

cies of total exhaustion rule are undermined since dismissed mixed petition may be
refiltered through federal courts). The total exhaustion rule permits a petitioner to remove
unexhausted claims from a habeas petition to avoid complete dismissal, see supra note 94
and accompanying text, while prior to Lundy, most lower court judges sua sponte dropped
the unexhausted claims from the mixed petition, see supra note 94. By relinquishing the
discretion of the district court judges to remove the claims sua sponte, the Court anoma-

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:316

the dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus when the court finds that
the petitioner has abused the writ by deliberately excluding new
grounds from an earlier petition."8 The interpretation by the plurality of Rule 9(b) effectively disregards the intent of Congress to
deny only those writs that contain grounds that the petitioner
"knowingly" and "deliberately" avoided in his first petition ee Furthermore, by initially refusing plenary review for failure to exhaust, and later barring habeas relief under Rule 9(b), the plurality
has created an insurmountable procedural hurdle that precludes
any habeas petitioner who has unwittingly included a meritorious
unexhausted claim in his habeas petition from securing a federal
forum. 100 It is suggested that the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine are adequately served by allowing the district courts discretion to consider whether to review some exhausted claims in a
mixed petition. 01a A "total exhaustion" rule, however, impairs federal-state comity because state courts are compelled to resolve friv02
olous unexhausted claims.1

lously assumes that the unwitting pro se petitioner will be aware of his option to amend his
habeas petition to exclude unexhausted claims. Cf. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 530 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (petitioner's opportunity to amend depends on his awareness of this option);
Recent Decision, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 309, 327 (1982) (typical petitioner will be unaware of his
option to amend, thwarting judicial economy). But cf. Yackle, supra, at 434-35 (if judge
advises petitioner, waste of judicial resources may result since petitioner may return to state
court and exhaust frivolous claims).
1) 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1982). Rule 9(b) provides, in pertinent part:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if . . . new and different
grounds are alleged, [and] the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
Id.
;, Lundy, 455 U.S. at 533-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) advisory committee note (1982) (quoting Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1963)) ("if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds
for federal collateral relief" from his first petition, he may be deemed to have violated rule
9(b)"); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963) (petitioner who neglected state remedy
will be denied habeas relief only when state procedures have been deliberately bypassed).
See generally Note, Rose v. Lundy and Rule 9(b): Will the Court Abuse the Great Writ?, 49
BROOKLYN L. REv. 335, 352 & n.101 (1982) (Sanders Court adopted deliberate bypass standard of Fay).
100 Cf. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 529-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (total exhaustion requirement will "trap the unwary pro se prisoner. . . whose only aim is to secure a new trial or
release from prison").
101 See id. at 523-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: The
Exhaustion Doctrine and Mixed Petitions-Rose v. Lundy and "Exhaustion" Under the
Illinois Post-Conviction Remedies, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 515, 523; cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 438 (1963) (federal judges hearing habeas claims have implicit discretion to deny relief
when petitioner deliberately bypassed state procedure).
102 Lundy, 455 U.S. at 525 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d
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In an effort to mitigate the harshness of the rule, some lower
federal courts have carved exceptions to the total exhaustion requirement. 10 3 For example, a federal court may review a mixed petition on the merits when the unexhausted claim is frivolous and
would require "exhaustion of a nullity.' 10 4 In addition, a mixed petition may be reviewed when state law renders the return of the
state claim to the state court futile because the substance of the
unexhausted claim has been specifically reviewed and rejected by
the state court.10 5 Indeed, a district court generally may dismiss
any unexhausted claim on the ground that it is highly unlikely to
provide relief to the petitioner.10 6
A minority of the circuits has attempted to alleviate the effect
of the total exhaustion rule by conducting plenary review of exhausted claims in a mixed petition when the state explicitly waives
a habeas petitioner's failure to exhaust all claims.0 7 These circuits
1050, 1054 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 980 (1984).
103

See infra notes 104-109 and accompanying text. Several of the circuit courts have

paid lip service to Lundy before carving exceptions into the "total exhaustion" rule. See,
e.g., Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1054 (6th Cir. 1983) (frivolous claim exception),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 980 (1984); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.
1983) (en banc) (state waived total exhaustion), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984); Hawkins v. West, 706 F.2d 437, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1983) (futility exception). But cf. Snethen v. Nix,
736 F.2d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir. 1984) (under Lundy, district courts must dismiss all mixed
petitions).
104 See Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1054 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
980 (1984). In Haggins, the court decided a mixed petition case on the merits because the
equal protection claim that the defendant advanced was "patently frivolous." Id.
103See Hawkins v. West, 706 F.2d 437, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1983) (useless to send claim
back to state court when federal claim yields same result); Williams v. Holbrook, 691 F.2d 3,
6 (1st Cir. 1982) (exhaustion requirement satisfied when substance of claims brought before
state and federal court are the same, even though federal claims might be somewhat reformulated); see also Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1984) (when state courts
foreclose corrective process, returning unexhausted claim to state court furthers no state
interest, thus undermining reasons for Lundy "total exhaustion" rule); Beaty v. Patton, 700
F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1983) (dismissal for exhaustion is unnecessary when attempt to invoke state procedure would be futile); Zelenka v. Israel, 699 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1983)
(exhaustion requirement is waived when state court has held adversely to petitioner's argument in other cases); cf. Perry v. Fairman, 702 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir. 1983) (petition should
be dismissed for failure to exhaust only if there is "near certainty" that state court will
entertain claim in question).
106 See Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1054 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
980 (1984); Hawkins v. West, 706 F.2d 437, 440 (2d Cir. 1983) (dictum).
107 See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(state, through attorney general, can wave exhaustion), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2180 (1984);
Sweezy v. Garrison, 694 F.2d 331, 333 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (attorney general unconditionally waived exhaustion request), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908 (1983); cf. Lacy v. Gabriel,
732 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.) (habeas petition cannot be invalidated if state raises unexhausted
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contend that permitting a state to waive its right of initial review
furthers the goals of comity, finality, and conservation of judicial
resources. 10 8 Incidental to the waiver doctrine, some circuit courts
also have permitted the continuance of an action pending a determination of the unexhausted claims in the state court, thereby
granting the state court discretion to review the unexhausted
claims on the merits or waive initial jurisdiction. 0 9
Thus, by creating extensive exceptions to Lundy, the circuits
have grappled with the inflexibility of the total exhaustion requirement.11 0 Through these exceptions, the circuits not only have cast
doubt on the propriety of the Lundy rule, but also have paved the
way for its inevitable overruling."' Clearly, an approach allowing
the district courts some discretion is preferable to a per se rule
requiring the dismissal of all claims in a mixed petition." 2 In an
claim), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 195 (1984); Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1167 (6th Cir.
1982) (exhaustion not required when district court sua sponte raises new issues). The Fifth
Circuit recognizes waiver by implication as well as explicit waiver in habeas cases. See McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1213 (5th Cir. 1984).
108 See McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1210-11, 1214 (5th Cir. 1984); Thompson v.
Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180
(1984); see also Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549, 554 (5th Cir. 1982) (permitting state waiver
because exhaustion is a matter of comity). But see Naranjo v. Ricketts, 696 F.2d 83, 86-87
(10th Cir. 1982) (state waiver not dispositive of exhaustion issue). The McGee and Thompson courts found indirect support for the state waiver doctrine from abstention cases such
as Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), in which the Court
held that the waiver of the Younger abstention doctrine was permissible when the state
voluntarily submits to a federal forum, id. at 479-80; see McGee, 722 F.2d at 1211; Thompson, 714 F.2d at 1503; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (federal courts
should abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances).
109 Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1983) (en
banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984); Collins v. Lockhart, 707 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir.
1983) (en banc); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 526 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
The goals of Lundy-comity, maximization of judicial resources, and prevention of delay-are fostered by continuance. Thompson, 714 F.2d at 1499. Furthermore, continuance is
not explicitly precluded by Lundy. Id.
110 See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Hall v. Iowa, 705 F.2d 286-87 (8th Cir.) (Lundy confined to federal claims;
federal district court may hear mixed petition when unexhausted state claims present no
issue of constitutional relevance), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 339 (1983); cf. Recent Decision,
supra note 97, at 328 (durability of Lundy is questionable since decision was based on inaccurate statutory interpretation). Precedent does not require adherence to the total exhaustion requirement. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 523-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see, e.g., Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519-20 (1972) (Court reviewed exhausted claim despite mixed petition); Picard v. O'Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (exhaustion requirement satisfied if
claim has been fully and fairly presented to state court).
12 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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effort to devise procedural barriers that discourage pro se petitioners from litigating their habeas claims, the Supreme Court risks
damaging federal-state comity and wasting judicial resources.11 A
district court judge should be able to dismiss a futile or frivolous
unexhausted claim in the interest of judicial economy, and, more
importantly, should be able to provide the petitioner with speedy
relief under the habeas corpus statute. 1 14 When a mixed petition
contains meritorious unexhausted claims interwoven with exhausted claims, continuance provides both ample deference to
state courts and a federal forum in which all the habeas petitioner's constitutional claims may be consolidated." 5 Furthermore,
it is submitted that continuance circumscribes the possibility of an
abuse of the writ sanction by preserving the original habeas
petition.'
SYNTHESIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISDICTIONAL POSTURE

The federal interest theory of jurisdiction recognizes a broad
power in Congress, under article III, to create federal jurisdiction
whenever a potential federal issue exists.1 7 To preserve federal ju"n See Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1984); Yackle, supra note 97, at
435.

" See Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1984) (futility doctrine furthers

federal judicial economy); Recent Decision, supra note 97, at 327 (discretion promotes judicial economy by avoiding summary review of all petitions for unexhausted claims); cf. Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963) (discretion provides flexibility to avoid illogical jurisdictional
bars); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (waiver
fosters comity and finality), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180 (1984).
'" See Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (continuance permits all of petitioner's claims to be heard at once), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2180
(1984); Collins v. Lockhart, 707 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1983) (case held in abeyance, as a
matter of comity, so that state court could litigate unexhausted claim); M. REDISH, supra
note 6, at 219 (continuance does not disturb state court judgment).
"I See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
"1
See M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 56; see also Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the
Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 216, 224 (1948) (Congress' greater
power to legislate includes lesser power to confer federal jurisdiction). The federal interest
theory derives from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 54-57; C. WRIGHT,
supra note 44, § 20, at 111. An expansive interpretation of Osborn recognizes a potential for
federal jurisdiction over any case involving even a remote federal issue, provided that Congress enacts a jurisdictional statute. See M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 56. But cf. Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 187-88 (1953) (limiting Osborn to those cases involving pre-existing federal interests or instrumentalities). Even
those who object to jurisdiction based on the expansive interpretation have recognized that
such an interpretation is valid. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:316

dicial resources for those cases involving significant federal interests and to promote comity, the federal courts have maintained a
policy of judicial restraint with regard to some types of cases that
technically are within the realm of federal jurisdiction, but do not
present an important federal question. 18 When Congress specifically has recognized a significant federal interest and has authorized federal jurisdiction, discretionary policies of judicial restraint
and comity are overridden.1 19
The habeas corpus statute, by offering fresh factfinding in a
federal district court in addition to ordinary appellate review, demonstrates a recognition by Congress that the availability of a federal remedial process above and beyond certiorari review will help
protect the important federal interest of redressing the unconstitutional incarceration of state prisoners.1 20 Conversely, the adequate
and independent state ground doctrine, as traditionally applied,
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
"I See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (no federal injunctions against
state criminal prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941) (federal courts to recognize state independence by
exercising discretion in asserting jurisdiction); cf. M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 216-17 (the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine prevents advisory opinions and fosters
comity).
219 See Mishkin, supra note 117, at 192 ("where there is an articulated and active
federal policy regulating a field," article III permits broad federal jurisdiction); cf. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964) (noting importance
of federal jurisdiction when statute provides for fresh factfinding); I1J. FRIENDLY, supra
note 28, at 95 (strength of federal interest is an important determinant regarding whether
federal courts should abstain). If federal law creates a duty and a remedy, federal jurisdiction usually will be found. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 17, at 95. Even when a federal
statute provides a duty without a remedy, a private cause of action may be implied in a
federal forum. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979)
(right of action in federal court may be implied from Congressional intent even though face
of statute authorizes no remedy); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
703 (1979) (Court will imply cause of action when remedy would accomplish underlying
purpose of statute). The Court's ability to imply remedies derives from Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824) (when there is a right, a remedy must
be available).
120 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-16 & n.27 (1963) (Congress clearly intended
method of federal review in addition to appellate process); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982); cf. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964) (appellate/certiorari review is "inadequate substitute for the initial District Court determination"). Even
Justice Frankfurter, whose opinions usually reflected a desire to define federal jurisdiction
narrowly, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474-75 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941), acknowledged and steadfastly supported broad federal collateral review in the area of habeas
corpus, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953). See generally Peller, supra note 45, at
583-85 & n.24 (discussion of broad scope of collateral review under Brown v. Allen).

19851

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

demonstrated a recognition by the Court that when a state court
renders a decision on the basis of both the state and federal constitutions, and Congress has not expressly conferred federal jurisdiction, the federal interest involved is correspondingly weak.121 Thus,
the Supreme Court has deferred to state court resolution of questions of state law tangentially involving inchoate federal constitutional issues.122 The Burger Court, however, has extended the federal interest doctrine past its outermost limit' 2 by reviewing state
cases that involve only a potential misconstruction of federal
law. 124 Therefore, by constricting habeas relief while expanding ap-

pellate review over ambiguously grounded state cases, 2 5 the Burger Court has refused to recognize a strong federal interest expressly stated by Congress, while creating jurisdiction when
Congress has been silent and the federal interests involved are
weak.

1 26

See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
See C. WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 7, at 22; cf. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3490
(1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (sound management of scarce judicial resources counsels policy of judicial restraint); -IJ. FRIENDLY, supra note 28, at 93 (federal court should abstain
from interpreting state statutes that have not yet been construed by state courts).
123 Even the most expansive interpretations of Osborn recognize that Congress must
act pursuant to article I to establish jurisdiction over potential federal questions. See M.
REDISH, supra note 6, at 55-56; cf. Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under," 54 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 978, 986 n.5 (1979) (Osborn rejects power in excess of jurisdiction).
124See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983). Through the holding in Long,
the Supreme Court authorized itself to accept appellate jurisdiction over state cases whenever the state court has not clearly indicated that its opinion was based on state law. Id.
This elusive jurisdictional posture permits the Court to hear state cases even when no federal right has been denied. See id. at 3490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court, almost exclusively, has invoked the Long presumption of jurisdiction when the state court has safeguarded an individual more protectively than the federal Constitution would require. See
Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984); cf. L. BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 90 (1981)
(screening process by Burger Court in criminal cases reflects pattern of accepting cases primarily brought by prosecutors).
121 See Comment, supra note 13, at 1099 (Supreme Court has reduced access to lower
courts while increasing oversight of state supreme courts).
128 Compare Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3474 (1983) (claim of state heard on the
merits although there was no denial of federal constitutional right) with Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 110 (1982) (plenary review of unconstitutional imprisonment denied due to procedural default) and Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982) (procedural default precludes
review). The federal interest doctrine mandates broad access to a federal forum in the area
of habeas corpus because significant federal interests are at stake. See supra notes 117-119
and accompanying text. The doctrine is violated when the Supreme Court assumes jurisdiction of state cases in which there is only a possibility of a misconstruction of federal law and
clarification from the state court is warranted. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, every state case brought to a federal court under the habeas corpus statute asserts a violation of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982) (petition must contend
121
122
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A common ground for the creation of federal jurisdiction is the
fear that states will not provide a neutral forum that adequately
protects the rights of litigants. 2 7 A constitutional example of such
"protective jurisdiction" is the provision for diversity jurisdiction
in article III.12s The same protective theory also underlies both the
habeas corpus statute 12 and the appellate jurisdiction statute
under which cases involving adequate and independent state
grounds may be reviewed. 30
The 1867 amendments to the habeas corpus laws reflect a congressional concern that state court judges would not adequately
protect the federal constitutional rights of state prisoners and
criminal defendants. '1 1 The Burger Court, however, by creating excessive procedural barriers that reduce the availability of habeas
that petitioner in custody in violation of Constitution or laws of the United States). However, ambiguously grounded state cases before the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari
may not allege any infringement of the United States Constitution. See Michigan v. Long,

103 S. Ct. 3469, 3490 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Long doctrine enables state prosecutors to argue that the state court has "over protected" a citizen. See id. (Stevens J., dissenting) This result is anomalous since the appellate jurisdiction statute is designed, in part,
to protect state citizens from the possibility that state courts will not adequately guard their
federal rights. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
127 See M. REDISH, supra note 6, at 59 & n.47. Congress has in certain instances granted
the federal courts jurisdiction over state matters when a significant federal interest is involved. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 20, at 111. The concept of "protective jurisdiction"
is an offspring of the Osborn federal interest theory. See id. at 111. The development of the
"protective jurisdiction" theory may be attributed to two scholars, Professors Mishkin and
Wechsler, with divergent views concerning the scope of the doctrine. See M. REDISH, supra
note 6, at 59. Compare Mishkin, supra note 117, at 192 (Congress can grant federal jurisdiction over state law whenever there is an "articulated and active federal policy regulating a
field") with Wechsler, supra note 117, at 224-25 (Congress can grant litigants a federal forum whenever Congress has the power to regulate substantively in a given area).
128 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); see also C. WRIGHT, supra
note 44, § 23, at 128 (diversity jurisdiction based on fear that state courts would prejudice
out-of-state litigants).
120 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-17 (1963). Since a habeas petitioner must assert a
violation of federal statutory or constitutional law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), he could
conceivably petition for Supreme Court appellate or certiorari review, see 28 U.S.C. §
1257(3) (1982). Nevertheless, the habeas statute guarantees a federal forum while the appellate statute provides only a possibility that the Supreme Court will review. Cf. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964) (noting importance
of securing federal forum).
110 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
121 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972) (Q 1983 enacted to protect
against state abuses); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-16 (1963) (habeas coverage extended to
state prisoners to guard against possible unfair state proceedings). See generally M. REDISH,
supra note 6, at 116-18 (post-civil war statutes illustrative of federal mistrust of willingness
of states to protect federal rights). But cf. Sheran, supra note 29, at 792 (effectiveness of
state court judges is increasing).
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review, has subverted the intent of Congress and has relied on untenured state court judges to monitor state criminal proceedings
and executive activity for federal constitutional violations." 2 Similarly, in enacting section 1257 of the Judiciary Code, Congress intended to permit Supreme Court appellate review of state decisions only when the state clearly impinged on some recognizable
federally created right. 133 Michigan v. Long and its progeny, however, authorize a discretionary posture that permits review of state
cases whether or not a federal right has been denied.13 4 If the Supreme Court accepts for review a case that does not involve the
denial of a federal right, federal protective jurisdiction is being exercised when such protection is unnecessary. 13 5 Thus, the Court is

risking unauthorized interference into state constitutional
lawmaking."3 6
The Burger Court repeatedly has stressed the importance of
comity, finality of decisions, and the maximization of judicial resources. 137 Yet, in both the areas of habeas corpus and adequate
MS2
See Neuborne,

The Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1127-31 (1977). Federal

judges, because of their life tenure and salary security, are excellent protectors of federal
constitutional rights. See Bator, supra note 3, at 623; Neuborne, supra, at 1127-30. Con-

versely, state court judges, subject to partisan pressures, are less likely to protect individual
rights. See Bator, supra note 3, at 623.
M See supra notes 38 and 126. To establish appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court, a state petitioner must satisfy one of the qualifications of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
When a federal right is denied, a state petitioner can appeal to the Supreme Court if a
federal treaty, statute, or constitutional provision has been explicitly invalidated. See 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1)-(2) (1982). Additionally, a state claimant may petition for a writ of certiorari when any right is "specially set up or claimed under the Constitution. . . ." Id. §
1257(3). Thus, Congress has not only refused to authorize appellate jurisdiction for potential
federal questions, but also has specifically limited appellate jurisdiction to recognizable federal issues. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 44, § 107, at 743 (federal question necessary to invoke Supreme Court jurisdiction under § 1257).
" See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
" See Comment, supra note 13, at 1101.
"' See Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 489, 498 (1977); Kelman, supra note 25, at 414; Wilkes, supra note 25, at 433-34.
,$7 See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3475-76 (1983); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
518-19 (1982); Comment, supra note 86, at 203. Justice Powell suggested that expansive
habeas corpus relief is antithetical to the following values:
(i) the most effective utilization of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of
finality in criminal trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and
state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance
upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); see Comment,
supra note 86, at 172; see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982) (discussion of the
costs to society and federalism due to writ of habeas corpus).
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and independent state grounds, the Burger Court's jurisdictional
mandates portend the diminution of these goals. 138 The Long policy of permitting review on the merits, even though an adequate
and independent state ground may exist, engenders a waste of judicial resources because of the high risk of advisory opinions, 3 9
harms federal-state comity through intrusion into state constitutional lawmaking, 40 and prevents finality, since the state court, on
4
remand, must review the case on the merits for the second time.' '
In the habeas corpus arena, the Lundy total exhaustion rule hinders comity and wastes state judicial resources by requiring the exhaustion of even frivolous state claims and prevents finality when
unexhausted claims are returned to the state courts only to be
taken back through the federal system at a later date. 142 In addition, since an attorney's failure to assert a plausible claim does not
satisfy the "cause" arm of the Sykes "cause and prejudice" standard, attorneys will advance every possible constitutional claim,
See infra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
See Comment, supra note 13, at 1095; supra note 26 and accompanying text.
140 See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3492 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Com118
119

ment, supra note 13, at 1096.
141 See, e.g., State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 426 (S.D. 1984) (Court reversed and
remanded case to state court); see Comment, supra note 13, at 1093; cf. H.J. FRIENDLY,
supra note 28, at 93 (federal court should abstain from interpreting unclear state law because subsequent, conflicting construction by state courts will render federal decision "futile
and unnecessary").
141 See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 524-25 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("total
exhaustion" rule may cause unnecessary adjudications by state and federal courts); Casenote, supra note 94, at 1356 ("total exhaustion" rule will increase burden on federal judges);
see also McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1984) (comity is undermined
when state court must endure expense and delay of reviewing unexhausted state claim that
must ultimately be decided in federal forum); Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495,
1505-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) ("total exhaustion" rule could delay finality), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2810 (1984); Yackle, supra note 97, at 435 (if ignorant habeas claimant
made aware of his options, he may return to state court to exhaust claims and then petition
for habeas relief again in federal court).
The ever increasing number of federal cases has been a constant concern of the Supreme Court. See J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 212 (2d ed. 1980); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism,29 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1203
& n.74 (1977). However, the impact of habeas petitions on the docket has been exaggerated
because the size of the federal judiciary has grown and the percentage of time that federal
judges spend on habeas corpus petitions is minimal. Comment, supra note 46, at 1632-33;
see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS (1983) (In 1983, 241,842 cases were filed in the federal district courts, but only 8,532

were habeas petitions by state prisoners); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1982) (delegating
some district court functions to magistrates). More importantly, cutting back on constitutional guarantees to preserve judicial resources is a "dangerous tool" for relieving overloaded
dockets. See Brennan, supra note 136, at 498.
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thereby impinging on state judicial resources and impairing comity
and finality by burdening state courts with excessive, possibly meritless federal constitutional claims.1 43 Thus, the Burger Court's attempts to achieve the goals of comity, finality, and judicial economy through decisions in the areas of habeas corpus and
ambiguously grounded state cases have not only resulted in virtual
judicial amendments to the congressional statutes conferring jurisdiction in these areas, but actually have undercut the policies the
Court purports to promote.14 4
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that recent Supreme Court jurisdictional decisions in the areas of habeas corpus and adequate and independent
state grounds have failed to maximize federal judicial power, and
may adversely affect the legitimacy of the Court as an institution.
To counteract the immediate and long-term ill effects of these recent pronouncements, this Note has advocated that the Long doctrine be replaced by a balancing of state and federal interests that
will reduce the opportunities for the Court to infringe on state constitutional lawmaking in the guise of correcting misapprehensions
of federal law. In addition, the Note has proposed the abolition of
the Sykes "cause and prejudice" standard and the reinstatement
of the Fay v. Noia "deliberate bypass" test, coupled in certain circumstances with a showing of fundamental unfairness. Finally, this
Note has suggested that post-Lundy decisions by lower federal
courts demonstrate the unworkability of the "total exhaustion"
rule, and has recommended that these lower courts be re-endowed
with the discretion to determine compliance with the exhaustion
requirement in deciding whether to review mixed habeas petitions.
Tonianne Florentino
143 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. Considerations of finality should not
undermine the goal of vindicating an individual who has been unjustly imprisoned. See
Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2910 (1984); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963); Comment,
supra note 46, at 1634. Since only a minimal percentage of state convicts petition for habeas
corpus, and the actual percentage who actually attain relief is even less, the importance of
finality has been exaggerated. See Comment, supra note 46, at 1633.
'44 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 503-06 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 86, at 204. Nothing in Article III grants the Supreme Court the power to
legislate. See U.S. CONST. art. IlI. Congress alone was vested with the lawmaking powers of
the government and has the sole authority to amend its own laws. U.S. CosNT. art. I, § 1; cf.
Saltzburg, supra note 52, at 368 (Congress should determine policy objectives in habeas
area).

